ABSTRACTS OF RECENT- DECISIONS.
dischmarqe qf his ditty, the witness must

have had a ditty resting upon him which
could only have been imposed by the
service of a subpwna. In the case of
71e State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, Chief
Justice REDFIELD, decided that if a
person knew he was to be a witness in
a public prosecution he was not only a
witness, but was in duty bound not to
secrete himself, so as to prevent the service of process, and the authorities seem
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to be conclusive to the effect that process
need not actually have been served:
State v. (7arpenter, 20 Vt. 9: State v.
Barly, 3 Harrington 562; 2 Wharton
on Crim. Law (7th ed.),
2287 - 4
Black. Corn. 126; 1 Bish. Criminal
Law, 665 ; I Russell on Crimes 183 ;
2 Bish. Crim. Pro.,
897 ; Commonwealth v. Reyn Ids, 14 Gray 87 ; State
v. Biebusch, 32 Mo. 276.
fH. B. Jounsox.

OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

1

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.

1

SUPREME COURT OF PENNS'YLVANIA.

$

SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.'

ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

Umpire.-By a parol agreement to submit a matter in controversy to
the arbitration of two persons, it was stipulated that, in case they cn-ld
not agree, they should select an umpire, and that the decision of such
umpire and any of said arbitrators should be final, &c. Reld, that the
decision of the umpire was all that was required. If one or both the
arbitrators had agreed with him, it would still have been the decision of
the umpire: Sanford et al. v. Wood, 49 Ind.
BANKRUPTCY.

Plea oJ.-Plea in bar that since the commencement of suit, the de.
fendants had been adjudged bankrupts, and the plaintiff had proved its
debt in bankruptcy, and that the bankruptcy proceedings were still
pending. Held, bad on general demurrer: .Brandon Manilacturing
Co. v. Frazer, 47 Vt.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Partnersltp- Want oj Autlrfty-Defence againstBond fide Holders.
-Adams, a partner of Moorehead & Co., drew a note in favor of Whitten & Co., of whom also lie was a member, and, after it was endorsed by
the payees, endorsed the name of Moorehead & Co.; the note was sold
to the plaintiff by a known bill-broker. Herd, that these circumstances
were not notice to the plaintiff that the endorsement was without authority: Moorehead v. Gilmore, 77 Pa
I From Jas. B. Black, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 49 Indiana Reports.
2 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 41 Maryland Reports.
3 From P. Frazer Smith, Esq., Reporter, to appear in 77 Pa. State Reports
4 From Hon. J. W. Rowell, Reporter ; to appear in 47 Vermont Reports.
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If the note had been offered by Whitten & Co., that would have been
notice that Moorehead & Co. were merely accommodation endorsers, and
sufficient to put the plaintiff upon inquiry: Id.
The broker was the agent of Whitten & Co. to sell, and not of the
plaintiff to buy; plaintiff was not bound to inquire by whom lie was
employed, nor would the broker, if asked, be bound to infbrin him : Id.
Each partner has the same right to raise money for the use of the
firm by endorsemeut of negotiable paper as to do so by means of paper
already issued, and the public is not affected by the private restriction
on the power of each partner: Id.
On the face of the note, it had come to Moorelcad & Co., by endorsement of Whitten & Co.; that it was originally given by Adams for his
individual debt was immaterial. The presumption was that the endorsemmunt of Moorehead & Co. was in the usual course of business: Id.
Nothing but clear evidence of knowledge or notice, fraud or mal
fides can impeach the prima facie title of the holder of negotiable
paper taken before maturity: 11.
Note taken in Payment of a Pre.existing Debt.-One who takes a
iiegotiable note befbre maturity, at its full value, in payment of a preexisting debt, in good faith, and without notice of anything that would
invalidate it in the hands of the payee, is a bonad fide holder fbr value,
and not affected by any equities existing between the original parties:
Russell v. Spbter, 47 Vt.
Warrant of Attorney to confess Judgment destroys _feotability.n
A note payable to order with interest, with an addition "ii case of nonpayment at maturity, five' per cent. collection fees to be added;" with
warrant of attorney to enter judgment for amount of the note and the
five per cent., with costs of suit, release of errors, without stay of execution, waiving exemption, inquisition and condemnation, and to sell on
ft. fi : H7eld, not negotiable, by reason of the warrant of attorney contained in it: Sweeney v. Thickstun, 77 Pa.
BROKER.

See

VMage.

For Sale of Real Estate-Rit to Conmmsson.-Where the owner
of real estate agreed with a real estate broker that he would pay him a
certain amount if he would find a purchaser within a reasonable time,
who would pay a certain price for his real estate, if within such time the
broker procured such purchaser, lie was entitled to recover his commission, though the owner of the real estate sold the same before the broker
found the purchaser : Lane v. Albright, 49 Ind.
COMMON CARRIER.

Owners of Tow-boats are not.-The owners of a tow-boat are not
common carriers; in an action by them for towing barges where, under
a plea of set-off and payment, the defendant alleged that the tow was
lost by the negligence of the owners of the boat, the burden was on
him to show such negligence: Hays v. Millar, 77 Pa.
The defendant having given evidence tending to show that the loss
was from the negligence of the plaintiff's pilot and engineer, evidence
that those officers were competent, skilful and careful, was inadmissible:
Id.
A master is responsible for the negligence of his servants in the
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course of their employment, without regard to their character for care
or skill; except in the case of fellow-servants, or of a servant employed
by him in some independent work. When an act or omission of def ndant is proved, whether it be actionable negligence, is to be determined by the character of the act or omission, not by the defendant's
character fbr care and caution : Id.
Bill of Lu ling- Consruc ion of.-Where a railroad company received
freight to be transported partly by rail and partly by water, and it was
stipulated in the bill of lading, that "it is especially agreed and understood that the company is not responsible * * * for loss or damage on
the lakes or rivers, unless it can be shown that such damage or loss occurred through the negligence or default of the agents of the company;"
and the freight, after being carried by the d6endant, was placed upon
a wharf-boat, awaiting the arrival of a packet wherein to ship it, and the
wharf-boat sunk without the fault of the railroad company, and the
freight was lost. field, that the loss was not one occurring on the lakes
and rivers within the meaning of the bill of lading. Held, also, that
the bill of lading should be construed to mean, that the carrier was not
to be responsible, in the absence of negligence, for loss or daiag'e
occurring in the navigation of the lakes or rivers: The St. L. & S. B.
Railway Co. v. Smuck et al., 49 Ind.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

Foreign Judgment for Alimony-Service by Publication.-A judgment for alimony rendered in another state, vhere the only notice to the
defendant *as by publication, and he did nbt appear, and the record
does not show that he was a resident of that state, can have do force in
this state: Middleworth et ux. v. McDowell, 49 Ind.
CONTRACT.

See Usage.

Whether Entire or Separate-Rescission- Gstorn.-Defendant bought
4000 barrels of oil from plaintiff, and eight similar papers of same date
were executed by them, each for the delivery of 500 barrels on the last
day of consecutive months, payment to be made on each delivery.
fiel, not to be an entire contract'- Morgan v. McKee, 77 Pa.
The plaintiff, on demand, refused to deliver the oil due on one of the
appointed days; the defendant on the next day for delivery, gave notice
of rescission, on the ground of the previous .default. Held, the plaintiff might recover for refusal of defendant to accept and pay for the oil
which was tendered on the days appointed for the subsequent deliveries : Id.
The right to rescind a contract must be exercised within a reasonable
time after the breach. What is a reasonable time, is for the court: Id.
Evidence was inadmissible, that at the time of the purchase it was
agreed that it was an entire contract, and that the several papers were
executed with that understanding and according to the custom of the
trade : Id.
Novation.-C. purchased the defendant's millinery goods, and in part
consideration thereof, agreed to pay the defendant's debt to the plaintiff.
C. thereupon wrote the plaintiff that her husband proposed to give his
note on six months for said debt, and the plaintiff replied, accepting the
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proposition The'note was never given, but C. made remittances to the
plaintiff from time to time, to apply on said debt. Held, a mere accord,
and that the defendant was not thereby discharged from the balance of
the debt: Rising v. Cummings, 47 Vt.
Waiver of a promise to pay the debt of another that is without consideration and within the Statute of Frauds, or refusal to receive such
payment, does not discharge the original debtor: Id.
COVENANT.

See Lease.

CRIMINAL LAW.

Ecidence- Characterof Person assaited.-To make it competent for

a party complained of for assault and battery, to show that the person
assaulted was quarrelsome and fractious, he must show that he had
knowledge of such fact; for the theory upon which such evidence is
admitted is, the influence which such knowledge may be supposed to
exert upon the conduct of the party in preventing or repelling an
assault: State v. Akader, 47 Vt.

See Contract; Evidence; Usage
See Bills and Notes; Contract.
CREDITOR.

CUSTOM.
DEBTOR AND

Application of Payments.-Payments made to a creditor holding de-

mands both due and undue, without direction by the debtor as to their
application, must, ordinarily, be.first applied by the creditor upon the
demands due: Early v. Flannery, 47 Vt.
DoWER.

See .Huisbandand Wife.
DURESS.

Duress oj imprisonment-Rescission of Contract.-If one, claiming

that he has purchased property, but knowing that he has not, maliciously,
and without probable cause, sues out a writ in trover for it, for the purpose of frightening and coercing the owner to sell it to him ; and the
owner, being a man of ordinary firmness, is thereby induced, through
fear of arrest and imprisonment, to. make such sale, the sale is void for
duress of imprisonment. Rehl, that it was not necessary, to make the
defence of duress of Imprisonment available, that the pretended vendor
should have offered to rescind the contract, and return a note given for
the purchase-money : Brownell v. Talcott, 47 Vt.
Avoidance of Promise for.-A promise extorted by terror or violence,
whether on the part of the person to whom the promise or obligation is
made or that of his agent, may be avoided on .the ground of duress:
Bush v. Brown, 49 Ind.
If a party execute an instrument from a well-grounded fear of illegal
imprisonment, he may avoid it on the ground of duress : I.
To a suit upon a promissory note, it is a good answer to allege that
the plaintiff induced the defendant to go with him to a secluded place,
and there accused the defendant of having performed an abortion upon
the plaintiff's wife, and that a certain person who was then present was
an officer, having power to arrest and imprison the defendant, and that
the plaintiff there threatened the defendant with immediate arrest and
imprisonment, unless the note in suit was made, and fearing such arrest
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the defendant made the note, and that he had never committed the
crime charged: -d.
EQUITY.
Apportionment of Expense of RepIairs among Joint Owners of Water-

.power-C
Costs.-It is the proper exercise of equity jurisdiction, to apportion among parties having a common interest in the use of a waterpower,
and on whom rests a common duty of maintaining the dam which
creates the power, the burden and expense of such duty : Sanborn v.
Br,ley, 47 Vt.
One-third of the orator's costs of taking testimony disallowed, because
of-unnecessary'prolixity : Id.
EVIDENCE. See Criminal Lab; Husband and Wife ; Usage.
When Parol Evidence is admissible in cases of Written Contracts.While parol evidence is inadmissible to alter, vary or contradict a written contract, it is admissible to prove an independent collateral fact
about which the written .ontract is silent: Fusting v. Sullivan, 41 Md.
Where by a written contract F. sells his store, the stock of goods
therein, his house, lumber-yard 'and luuiber therein, barn and barn-yard
to S. upon terms specified, parol evidence is admissible to show that it
was verbally agreed between the parties during the negotiation, and
before the contract was concluded, that S bought with the distinct understanding that F would not go into business in Catonsville, the place
where the store was located, and that the acquisition of the good-will of
the store and the agreement of F. not to set up another store in Catonsville, was part of the consideration of the purchase: Id.
Name-Idem Sonans.-A deed described the land thereby conveyed
as being in " Lington," in the county of Addison. 1ehl, that the name
"Lington." was so like the name Lincoln, a town in said county, and so
unlike the name of any other town in the county, that the deed was properly admitted in evidence, in connection with other evidence showing
the situation and circumstances at the time as tending to show that the
locus in quo was the land conveyed by the deed: Armstrong v. Colby,
47 Vt.
Declarations against Interest.-In trover, the defendants claimed
title to the property through B., who turned it over to them to secure a
then existing debt. flehl, that the declarations of B. against his title
to the property, made while it was in his possession, and before he assigned it to the defendants, were admissible against the defendants, and
that they might be proved by persons other than B. : Alger v. Andrews,
47 Vt.
Telegraph Dispatch-Secondary Evidence.-In an action against a
telegraph company for damages for failure to transmit a dispatch, the
original dispatch delivered to the operator must be given in evidence, or
if not, its absence must be properly accounted for before secondary evidence thereof can be admitted: The Western Union Tel. Co. v. 11opkins, 49 Ind.
FOREIGN JUDGM ENT.

See Coniflict of Laws.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
See Contract.
Promise to pay another's Debt.-Long sold his interest in a firm to
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Ilis partner for 8700, the partner to pay all the debts of the firm ; the
$700 being unpaid, the partner sold to Townsend, who, by parol, agreed
hld, that the
to pay the amount due Long as the consideration.
promise was not within the Act of April 26th 1855, sect. 1 (Frauds),
and Townsend was liable to Long on his promise : Townsend v. Long,
77 Pa.
The general rule is that a parol promise to pay the debt of another is
within the siatute, where it is collateral to a continued liability of the
original debtor : Id.
If a parol promise be to pay absolutely or conditionally the debt of
another, due or to become due on an existing contract, it.is generally
within the Statute of Frauds: Id.
The consideration for the promise is important only where it is-a
transfer of the cr~difor's claim to the promissor, making the transaction
a purchase, or where it is a transfer of a fund pledged, set apart or held
for the payment of the debt : Id.
GIFT.

nperfect.-An account was opened in a savings' bank to the credit
of "James Cannon, subject to his order, or to the order of Mary E.
Cannon," his daughter; and money from time to time was thus deposited.
Upon the death of James Cannon, Mary E. Cannon claimed that her
father, in his lifetime, had given her the book of deposit with the money
credited therein, to be held by her in trust for herself, and her brothers
and sisters. The only mode in which money could be changed from one
person's accbunt to another's in the bank was " by a payment of the one
account and a new deposit in another account." Upon a bill filed by the
adninistratrix of James Cannon claiming the money in bank as belonging
to his estate, it was ield, that the deceased had not parted with the legal
dominion and control over the money standing in his name in the bank,
because it was there subject to his order, or the orier of his daughter;
nor did the delivery o' the book of deposit constitute a delivery of the
money, and the complainant was therelbre entitled to it as of the estate
of her intestate: .Marry v. Cannon, 41 Md.
IIUSB3AND AND

WIFE.

Declarations at time of executing Deed-Conreyance in Fraul of
Dowcer.-In a proceeding to have a deed declared fraudulent and void
as against the rights of the widow of the grantor, his declarations to
the conveyancer with respect to the deed, and his object and purpose
in making it, being contemporaneous with its preparation and execution, are admissible in evidence : Sanborn v. Lang, 41 Md.
A married man by a deed voluntary and without valuable consideration, conveyed nearly the whole of his property to his nephew. To the
conveyancer who prepared the deed, he stated that his purpose was to
deprive his wife of the property. The deed was executed on the 20th
of May 1872, and recorded the same day in Baltimore. The grantee
lived in New Hampshire and never had possession of the deed till after
the death of the grantor in July 1873. Before the deed was executed,
a power of attorney was sent to the grantee and executed by him in
New Hampshire. by which the grantor was authorized " to sell and cnnvev. inort,_ame or otherwise dispose of the property." In August 1872,
Vor. XXIV.-8
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the grantor wishing to borrow 81000 for his own use. one of the pieces
of property mentioned in the deed, was mortgaged to securd it. The
mortgage and notes were sent to the grantee aud by him were executed.
The grantor remained in possession of the property embraced in the
deed, until his death. On a bill filed by the widow against the grantee,
to have the deed declared void as in fraud of her rights, it was Ihdd:
that the deed was not made bona fide ; but as to the complainant was
fraudulent, and could not operate to deprive her of her legal rights as
widow and distributee : Id.
INSURANCE.

Interest of Insured.-A policy of insurance provided that if the interest or property insured be leasehold, or that of mortgager or any other
interest not in fee simple in case of real estate, or absolute as to personal
property, such must be made known to the company, and expressed in
the policy. Held, that said provision was only obligatory upon the
insured when the united interest of the insured in the property was less
than absolute: Rankin v. Andes Izs Co., 47 Vt.
Re-isuranee-Policy-Estolpel.--Where property is insured, and
the insurer re-insures, and it is destroyed by fire, and before the loss is
paid, the original insurer becomes bankrupt, and the assured receives
but a small dividend out of the bankrupt's estate, the re-insurer is still
liable to pay the whole amount of the re-insurance to the trustee of the
original insurer, without deducting the dividend, and the original assured
has no claim in respect of the money so paid ConsolidatedReal Estate
& _Hre Ins. Co.v. Cashow, 41 Md.
Where a policy of insurance containing lan acknowledgment of the
receipt of the premium, has been issued and delivered to the assured,
the insurance company will not be permitted to allege a want of consideration for its promise when sued thereon, after a loss has happened:
Id.
By a policy of re-insurance, the insurance company stipiated that
su
their insurance of $5000, was part of the Is
m or sunis insured by the
Fulton Fire Ins. Co. of New York as above, for Newhall, Boric & Co.
by their policies Nos. 2335 and 2779, and to be subject to the same risks,
valuations, conditions and mode of settlements as are or may be adopted
or assumed by said company." In an action on the policy, it was lIebl:
that this clause not only dispensed with preliminary proof of loss. but
fastened the responsibility of the defendant, to the settlement and adjustment made by the original insurer with the original assured, as to the
amount of loss: Id.
LEASE.

Covenant for quiet Enjoyment-Elder and better Title.-A covenant
for quiet enjoyment relates to the lessor's title and right to grant the
premises, and to the possession thereof during the term, and not to their
possession and enjoyment in fact by the lessee, as against those having
no right to disturb him. It is a covenant that the lessee shall not be
rightfully disturbed in his possession and enjoyment during the terni,
not that he shall not be disturbed at all: Underwood v. Birchrd,47
Vt.
The defendants, as trustees, leased trust property to the plaintiff,
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which was in tie possession of third parties, under an agreement with

the defendants' predecessors in tile trust. Said parties continued in
possession of the property during the plaintiff's term, and would not
surrender to him. It did not appear that said parties were entitled under
said agreement, to hold as against the plaintiff, nor that they had any
other title by which they could rightfully keep him out. Held, that the
plaintiff was not kept out by title elder and better than his own: .1d.
LIEN.

See Trust.

LImITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Promise to ~ay Debt barredby-aymient of Interest on.-Where the
remedy on a single bill has become barred by the statutory lapse of time,
the mere payment of interest on the debt will raise no such promise as
will support dssumpsit for the amount due on the single bill. Nothing
less than an cxp~ress promise to pay the amount due thereon, made after
the statute has become a bar to the remedy on the bond itself, will suffice to maintain an action of assumpsit to recover the amount due:
Leonard v. iughlett, 41 Md.
In an action of assumpsit on an express promise to pay the amount
due on a single bill barred by limitations, the single bill may be given
in evidence as the inducement to, or as explanatory of, and as furnishing ihe legal basis of the express promise : Id
MASTER AND SERVANT.

See Common Carrier.

MERGER.

Of, mjle ontract in Specialty.-There cannot be a contract under
seal and a simple contract between the same parties for the payment of
the same debt. There will be a merger of the simple contract, whether
the parties wish it or not, for the two contracts are incompatible, and,
except where one is intended to be simply collateral to the other, they
exist together, and the higher must prevail: Leonard v. Htughcannot
lett, 41 Md.
NAME See Evidence.
See Common Carrier.
NEGLIGENCE
Railroad Train-jaryto ondlutor-Knowledge-Aaste and Servant-Damages.-Bythe custom and regulations of a railroad company,
trains in convoy were equipped, each with one engineman, one fireman,
one conductor and one brakeman. The conductor of a train in convoy,
on such road, had his leg crushed by collision with the train immediately following his, and died shortly thereafter. In an action against
the railroad company by the widow of the deceased to recover damages
for his loss, it was Held, That if he had knowledge of this custom and
practice at the time of his employment and afterwards, and with such
knowledge continued for eight or nine months in his employment, as
conductor on trains in convoys thus equipped, ana also knew that the
train following his on the night of the collision was equipped in the
sune manner, such knowledge on his part would prevent a recovery on
account of any supposed deficiency in equipment in this respect: Baltinor, & Ohio Railroad CJo. v. State. use of Woodwarl, 41 Md.
In an action against a railroad company, by a widow to recover dam-

60
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ages for the killing of her husband by a collision of trains of the

defendant, he being at the time in the employ of the defendant, the
jury, in assessing the damages, if they find ilbr the plaintiff, must estimate the reasonable probabilities of the life of the deceased, when
injured, and give the plaintiff such pecuniary damages as will compensate her for losses already suffered as the direct consequence of* her
husband's death, and also fbr the prospective losses she will suffer as the
direct consequence of such death during the period, the jury, under all
circumstances, shall deem to be the probable duration of her life : Id.
PARTITION.

Mortgagee of undivided Interest vot a proper party to.-A mortgagee
of an interest in an undivided estate is not entitled to be made a party
to a proceeding in partition; cannot do any act affecting the title or
estate of his mortgagor; nor can he object to partition by the parties
themselves; if competent, they are not bound to go to law to make the
partition: Long's Appeal, 77 Pa.
When partition is made, the security of the mortgage follows the
separation and attaches to the estate held in severalty . Id.
The mortgagee may object to fraud or unfairness affecting his interest; but if the partition be fairly made lie cannot gainsay it: Id.
PARTN ERSHIP.
RAILROAD.

See Bills and .Notes.
See Neghligence.

SHIPPING.
Repairs to a Vessel-Authority oJ Captain to pledge Owner's Credit
-Authority of Owner to pledge Credit of 'his Co-owner.-The captain
of a vessel, as such, has no authority to pledge the credit of the owner
for necessary repairs made at the home port, where the owner resides,
and can be consulted, and can personally interfere: entz v. Clarke, 41
Md.
And the fact that the captain is also a part owner of the vessel, gives
him no authority to pledge the credit of his co-owner for such repairs.
In order to bind the owner of a vessel for necessary repairs done at the
home port where lie resides and can personally interfere, the master must
have special authority for that purpose; or the owner must have held
out the master as having such authority ; or he must have ratified the
contract after it was made: Id.
SURETY.

Voluntary Paynent by Surety.-When a surety pays a debt, he
must be legally bound for it, to enable him to recover the amount paid
of the principal, and the principal must also, at the same time, be under
a legal obligation to pay the debt. Hollinsbee v. Ritchey, 49 Ind
In an action of replevin, where a bond is filed and possession of the
property obtained, and afterward the suit is dismissed by agreement of
the parties, the plaintiff agreeing to pay the defendant a certain sum,
but where no judgment is rendered, if the surety on the replevin bond
afterward, without the request of the plaintiff, pay the amount agreed
to be paid to the defendant. he can not recover the same of his principal, the payment being voluntary on the part of the surety : Id.
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Fairness to Suretyi-Dutyl of Surety.-As a rule of law, strict integrity and complete fairness are due from the creditors of a debtor to one
who ii about to become surety for such debtors; but this rule will not
excuse tile person about to become surety from reasonable attention to
the circumstances under which he is called upon and reasonable diligence to inform himself as to the prudence of the act lie is about to do:
Stedn& et al. v. Boone, 49 Ind.
If a person who is asked to become surety for another is put upon
his'guard by the circumstances surrounding the party for whom he is
asked to become surety, and can ascertain from the persons present all
the facts necessary to shield himself from fraud, he should make the
inquiry: .Td.
Fraud must not be induced by the person who complains of it, nor
must lie suffer himself to become an indolent victim: Id.
TRUST.

Trustee's Lien for Reimbursement of F-.penses.-Trustees have an
inherent equitable right to be reimbursed all expenses reasonably incurred in the execution of the trust; and it is immaterial that there are
no provisions for such expenses in the instrument of trust: Rensselaer
& Saratoga Railroad Co. v. Miller, 47 Vt.
All such expenses are a lien upon the trust property; and the trustee
will not be compelled to part with the property until such expenses are
paid : .td.
USAGE.

See Contract.

Real lstate Broer- Unlaitful Commissions- Uageor Custom cannot
control a well-establishedprincipleof Law.-When a real estate broker,
employed to sell a farm, disposes of it by way of exchange for other real
estate, lie is not entitled to charge the owner of the latter a commission
Th6 law does not permit the broker in such
for effecting the exchange
a case to act as agent for both parties. Even an agreement to pay such
commission, could not be enforced by an action thereon: Raisin v.
Clarke, 41 31d.
Nor could an action for the recovery of such commission be maintained, although by a custom or usage existing among brokers in the
place where the exchange was effected, they were entitled in exchanges
of real estate to a commission of two and a half per cent. from each
party, on the amount or value of the property exchanged : Id.
Custom of Trade- Cannot control jplain Language of Contract.MIcKee, by written agreement, sold the coal on his fhrm to defendants
for 10 cents for each ton " of screened coal mined and removed from his
laud." The defendants mined and screened and removed both lump
ebl, that evidence was inadmissible to show that
and nut coal.
"screened coal" is understood amongst coal merchants and miners to
include only lump coal ; or to prove the relative value and quality of
lump and nut coal for the purpose of showing that nut coal is not
"screened coal," in its common acceptation ; that at tfie time of the
contract there was no market for nut coal, and that it was removed front
necessity and did not pay expenses: Mercer Mininig Co. v. XcKee,
Adn'r, 77 Pa.
Although the meaning of a term used in a contract and applied to an
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article in a trade or business, may be proved Ify persons engaged in it,
yet the defendants having screened and removed both kinds of coal, were
estopped to allege that either was not " screened coal :" Id.
VENDOR AND -PURCHASER.

Defaulting Purchaserat an, Executor's Sale, entitled ipon a Re-sale of
the property, to the Surplus Proceeds.-An executor under and by virtue
of aipower in the will of his testator, sold certain real estate, and the
purchaser signed a written memorandum whereby he agreed and bound
hiniself to comply with the terms of sale upon the ratification thereof by
the-Orphans' Court. The sale was reported to, and finally ratified by,
the court. The purchaser having made default in ctmplying with ti
terms of sale, the court in pursuance of the provisions of the Act of
1870, ch. 82, ordered the property to be re-sold at .his risk. The property was accordingly re-sold, and the amount bid at the re-sale exceeded
that bid at the first sale. The original purchaser thereupon claimed this
excess, or so much thereof as might remain alter payment of all proper
expenses, cost and charges for which he was liable by reason of his default. This claim was resisted by the executor. 1tU.I st. That as the
property at the re-sale was sold as that of tlhe first purchaser, and at his
risk, he was entitled to whatever balance might remain of the proceeds
of the re-sale, after deducting the costs and expenses attending the resale, incliding a reasonable fee for services of counsel in filing the petition and procuring the necessary orders thereon for the re-.salc ; the executor's commissions on the whole amount of the proceeds of the re-sale,
and the amount of the original purchase-money with interest thereon
from the date of the first sale to the time of the receipt of the purchasemoney by the executor from the purchaser at the second sale. 2d.
That the right of the original purchaser to this balance, was not in any
way affected by the fact that he was without means of payment, and had
given no security for ilhe payment of the purchase-money, and would
have bee6i unable to pay the loss to the estate of the testator, if the property had sold at the second sale for less than the amount of the original
purchase: Mealey v. Page, 41 Md.
Sale of land by Quantity or as a Whole-Abatenzent or RTcrease of
Purchase-money-Equity.-Where the intent of a contract for sale of
land is clearly to Make a sale by the acre, as the means of determining
the price, and the contract is in fieri, the rule is to compel payment of
purchase-money, according to the quantity; and a survey to ascertain
the quantity is presumed to have been intended without an express
provision for it: Coughenour's Adn'rs v. Staift, 77 Pa.
In some eases equity will relieve where tle difference in quantity is
so great that it strikes the mind as evidence of gross mistake or fraud:
Vd.
When a contract, whether executory or executed, is with reference to
an official survey, it will be construed to be a sale according to the
quantity stated in it, unless there be express provision for remeasurement, or fraud or such palpable mistake as is evidence of it: Rt.
Where the contract is executed by deed, or by bond or other security
taken for unpaid purchase-money, the rule is not to open such contract
to allow a deficiency or recover for an excess, even if the sale be by the
acre : Id.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

The rule that a sale by the acre calls for a survey to fix the quantity,
will yield always to the intent of the parties to abide by the quantity
stated in the agreement or referred to in other writings : 11.
The sale being of a defined tract, the quantity named being said to be
"more or less," these words are of great force in determining the intent
of the parties to stand upon the quantity stated.
A contract was to sell a piece of land, naming adjoiners, &c., "1containing 91 J acres, more or less, being the same and all the land whereon
(veidor)now resides," for $10,500, payable, &c., "the remaining unpaid
balance to be paid * * * at the rate of $114.40 per acre;" the $10,500
was about $4 more than 911 acres at $114.40. The land, by a subse(jucil survey, contained 118 acres. Held, that the $10,500 was the sum
fixed to be paid as the purchase-money, and the vendor could not recover
for the excess above 91J acres, although the contract was executory:
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.

See Eguity.

Construction of Grant-Liability of Tenant in Conmnon of Waterpower to Co-tenant.-Covenant, that "in case there is not at any time
a full supply of water for the simultaneous operations of the works connected with the dam, the grist-mill shall draw its requisite quantity of
water, exclusive of all other works." Iteld, that the grist-mill right
was not merely a right to use the water exclusively in the manner and
for the time. it was then accustomed to be used, but a right to use the
water in quantity as then used, and for such length of time during the
season of scarcity as the custom and business of the mill might require;
and that if the work done in six hours by the wheel substituted for the
one in the mill when the covenant was made, was as much as that done
by the latter in twenty-fbur hours, and with the use of less water, there
would seem to be no breach of covenant, provided the business done
was the same in character as that being done when the covenant was

made: Howe Scale

Co.

v. Terry, 47 Vt.

At the time the defendants purchased said grist-mill, the flume and
wheel that had been used to opbrate the plaintiffs machine-shop on the
opposite side of the stream, had rotted away, and could not be used.
The defendants operated said grist-mill as it ever had been operated,
and with proper care, and used water whieh otherwise could be used by
no one. The plaintiff had no flume, wheel, or other appliance by which
the water could be used, and gave the defendants no notice that in
grinding at their mill they were working injury to the plaintiff, or that
the plaintiff purposed or desired to rebuild its works and use the water.
The declaration alleged that the defendants had used the water so as
wrongfully to deprive the plaintiff of the use thereof to operate the
w1teel of said machine-shop. Held, that the defendants, by continuing
the use of their grist-mill in the ordinary manner, without notice from
the plaintiff as aforesaid, were guilty of no actionable wrong to the
plaintiff; and Held also, that if the defendants should use the whole
water of the stream, when the plaintiff had no machinery or provision
for its use, such use would be presumed to be with the consent and for
the benefit of all: Id.

